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Abstract
Hostility towards minorities may sometimes have economic rather than racial motives.
Labour market fears, or concerns about the welfare system, may manifest themselves in
hostile remarks and actions against population groups that are considered to be com-
petitors for these resources, as well as political radicalisation. The question of what are
the components of (often hostile) attitudes of majority populations towards minority re-
lated questions, like attitudes towards further immigration, are of great importance for
implementing appropriate policies, and to identify the sources of hostility seems crucial
for understanding the e±cacy of political actions. We try to isolate the components of
such attitudes. Our analysis is based on the British Social Attitudes Survey, which in-
cludes questions on attitudes towards immigration from di®erent minority groups, as well
as attitudes towards related concerns, like job security and bene¯t expenditures. This
information allows us to explore the components of attitudes towards immigration. We
specify and estimate a multifactor model. The correlation between answers to questions
on immigration and on related issues help us separate di®erent aspects to attitudes.
¤Very Preliminary
yWe are grateful for comments and suggestions by Joseph Altonji, Hidehiko Ichimura,
and Frank Windmeijer.
11 Introduction
Over the last 4 decades, Europe has experienced large scale immigration. The
ratio of the foreign born population approaches 10 percent in many European
countries, and the percentage of ethnic minorities in ¯rst, second and third
generation are even higher. In some regions, national minorities may even be
locally majority populations. Immigrating populations (in particular, those
in the second half of the 20th century) often di®er quite substantially in terms
of cultural, religious, and ethnic background from the indigenous population.
Attitudes of the majority population towards minorities, or towards fur-
ther immigration, are often hostile, and can lead to outbreaks of social unrest.
Politicians and the public are often puzzled by the strong, and sometimes
violent, reactions of large groups of the indigenous population towards mi-
norities, or minority related questions. The reasons and motives for these
reactions are unclear. There are speculations that they may be related to
deeper racist views as well as to economic fears concerning the labour market
or the welfare state.
Despite its importance, there is little empirical research contributing to
our understanding about the true nature of attitudes towards minority re-
lated issues. Hostility towards minorities may sometimes have economic
rather than racial motives. Labour market fears, or concerns about the wel-
fare system, may manifest themselves in hostile remarks and actions against
population groups which are considered to be competitors for these resources,
as well as political radicalisation. To identify the sources of hostility seems
crucial for understanding the e±cacy of political responses. Furthermore,
identi¯cation of the sources of hostility may help to identify groups in the
native population whose concerns need to be addressed most urgently. For
2instance, if hostility is related to poor economic conditions (like unemploy-
ment), improving these conditions has e®ects over and above those of imme-
diate interest.
One important issue relating to minorities is that of policy towards im-
migration. Opposition to ethnic minority immigration may be motivated by
racial prejudice but can also stem, for instance, from fears among particular
skill groups that immigrants will compete with them in the labour market
or from fears that high levels of unemployment among likely immigrants will
impose high ¯scal costs on the indigenous population (see Borjas (1999) or
Simon (1989) for a discussion of the e®ects of immigration).
In this paper, we attempt to separate racial components of attitudes
towards immigration from other sources of hostility to immigration, includ-
ing labour market fears and concerns about welfare system use. We base
our analysis on various waves of the British Social Attitude Survey, which
asks questions about attitudes towards immigration from di®erent minority
groups, including some more and some less ethnically similar to the indige-
nous population. They also ask about attitudes towards related concerns,
like job security and bene¯t expenditures. This information allows us to ex-
plore the components of attitudes towards immigration. For this purpose, we
specify and estimate a multiple factor model which imposes some structure
on our problem. Correlations between answers to questions on immigration
and on related issues will help separate di®erent aspects to attitudes. Com-
parison of answers regarding immigration from di®erent sources will help
establish the plausibility of interpretation of remaining factors as involving
racial attitudes.
32 Some Theoretical Consideration
Attitudes towards immigration are strongly related to the way individuals
from the majority population perceive the e®ects of immigration on the econ-
omy.
There exists a large literature which analyses the e®ects of immigration
on the welfare of the native population. The structure of these equilibrium
models can be quite simple, and they may mirror the way individuals from
the majority population assess the e®ects of immigration. Immigration from
di®erent source countries may be associated with di®erent consequences by
the host country population. Furthermore, these consequences may be of
di®erent relevance to natives in di®erent segments of the labour market, and
di®erent regions of the country.
To be more speci¯c, the impact of immigration will depends crucially on
the ways in which the immigrant population di®ers from the native popula-
tion. Suppose that immigrants are identical to natives in all characteristics,
including their capital endowment, demographic and racial composition, and
their skill mix. Even in this case, immigration will increase population den-
sity, which may have consequences for natives, for instance, in increasing
pressure on the housing market. Also, if land is an input to production, it
could potentially change input prices.
Suppose now that immigrants have di®erent capital endowments to na-
tives. Then immigration changes the capital-labour ratio, which ought, de-
pending upon the nature of the wage setting mechanism, to a®ect either
or both returns to labour, or the level of unemployment. This will a®ect
individuals di®erently, depending upon their position in the labour market,
particularly their perceived job security. Increases in unemployment will also
4a®ect those in work through tax payments if it results in higher costs in the
bene¯t system. In so far as immigrants from di®erent sources are expected to
carry di®erent capital endowments this could give reason for di®erent native
attitudes to immigration from di®erent origins.
Immigrants may also di®er from natives in their human capital. If the
skill mix among immigrants di®ers from that of natives then one would also
expect immigration to lead to changes in the relative returns to di®erent
skill groups or to changes in the relative rates of unemployment. The details
here are theoretically far from straightforward, depending upon patterns of
complementarity and substitutability between di®erent skills in production.
However, there are clear reasons for individuals in di®erent skill groups to
have di®erent concerns. For instance, it seems natural to expect the unedu-
cated to be more fearful of the e®ects of low skill immigration.
A further dimension of di®erence may be the demographic composition.
Borjas (1997), for example, has drawn attention to the possible impact of
immigration on dependency ratios, and the consequent e®ects on cost of the
bene¯t and social security systems. It may also have e®ects on the ¯nancing
of the educational or health system.
Finally, immigrant populations are often culturally and racially di®erent
from the native population. The impact on ethnic and cultural diversity
may be either welcomed or not, depending on the attitudes of the native
individual concerned.
Most of these perceived e®ects can be seen as operating through one or
other of three main dimensions: racial composition of the population, the
person's own economic position, and the cost of the welfare system.
53 Data and Descriptives
Our attitudinal data is drawn from 8 years of the British Social Attitudes
Survey (1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1991). We use the data
for England and concentrate on white respondents only.1
The survey has extensive socioeconomic information on respondents, in-
cluding education, income, age, religion, and labour market status. In Table
1 we report summary statistics. We use two variables describing the char-
acteristics of the locality of residence: the unemployment rate, and the con-
centration of ethnic minorities. In both cases, we measure these variables at
the county level to minimise endogeneity issues arising from location choice
(see Dustmann and Preston (1999)).2
The individual's own characteristics include their income situation, labour
market characteristics, education, age, sex, and religious beliefs. The house-
hold income variable is reported in banded form in the data. Rather than
calculating a continuous measure in units of income, we have computed the
average percentage point of households in that band in the income distri-
bution, for the speci¯c year in which the individual is interviewed. When
thinking about the e®ect of income on attitudes, we have in mind the e®ect
of the relative position of the individual in the income distribution, rather
than some absolute income measure. Our de¯nition of household income
seems therefore quite natural in this context.
1Attitudes of ethnic minority individuals towards their own communities, or towards
other ethnic minorities, are likely to be driven by di®erent mechanisms. While it might
be interesting to investigate their attitudes, the sample sizes within the BSA become very
small when considering attitudes of minorities only.
2County is an administrative unit, covering on average 1.27 m people.
6Table 1: Sample Statistics
Variables Mean StdD
Unemployment rate, County level 0.0437 0.0203
Ethnic minority concentration, county 0.0262 0.0285
Rank in Income Distribution 0.5008 0.2877
Manual worker 0.4555 0.4980
Ever unemployed 0.1687 0.3745
Ever long term unemployed 0.0609 0.2392
Female 0.5368 0.4986
High Education Level 0.1017 0.3022
Low Education Level 0.4991 0.5000
Age 45.936 17.706
Catholic 0.1005 0.3007
No religion 0.3462 0.4757
The average age of individuals in the sample is about 46 years. Age is
likely to a®ect attitudes for several reasons. First, it is a direct measure of
life experience, which bears a strong e®ect on attitudes. Second, it marks
the position of the individual in their economic cycle. At some stages of
this cycle, individuals' attitudes may be more strongly a®ected by economic
considerations. Finally, the age variable captures cohort e®ects.
We also include dummy variables indicating whether the individual is a
manual worker, has ever been in unemployment, either short or long term,
and is female.
We have generated two dummy variables which allocate individuals to a
high education category depending upon whether they remained in education
beyond age 18 and to a low education category depending upon whether they
left school before age 16. Education is likely to a®ect attitudes for several
reasons. Higher education may shape attitudes by exposing the individual
7to a wider range of views. Education is also likely to pick up aspects of
peoples' long term economic prospects which are not captured by the before
mentioned variables. Finally, we have added two variables on religious beliefs.
Our ultimate interest is in understanding the factors which a®ect the
attitudes towards immigration. The BSA survey asks for several years ques-
tions concerning opinions about immigration from di®erent origin countries.
Speci¯cally, distinctions are drawn between immigration from the West In-
dies, from India and Pakistan, from other countries in the European common
market, and from New Zealand and Australia.3 We create binary variables
for all these responses. In the appendix, we report the full wording of the
original questions and some summary statistics. Hostility towards immigra-
tion from the former two sources is clearly stronger. We hypothesise that
racial factors are more prominent in in°uencing attitudes towards ethnically
di®erent immigrants.
To decompose these attitudes into the three factors we have discussed
above, we use an array of questions which are speci¯c to the suggested un-
derlying concerns of respondents. In particular, questions related to race
comprise opinions on inter ethnic marriage, acceptability of an ethnic minor-
ity superior at work, and self rated prejudice against minorities. Questions
related to labour market concerns include fear of job loss, perception of job
security, perceived ease of ¯nding a new job, and expectations of wage growth.
Finally, questions related to welfare concerns cover opinions on generosity of
bene¯ts, needs of welfare recipients, and preparedness to pay higher taxes
to expand welfare provision. Again, the exact wording of the questions and
3The wording of these questions changed in 1991. Therefore, we restrict our analysis
to the surveys before 1991.
8summary statistics are given in the appendix.
Table 2: Sample Sizes by Year
Variables 83 84 85 86 87 89 90 Total
Less West Indian 1140 1051 757 883 804 4635
Less Asian 1156 1060 756 885 804 4661
Less European 1151 1056 756 883 803 4649
Less Australian 1155 1058 754 882 806 4655
Marriage 1186 1113 833 1015 4147
Boss 1199 1117 850 1022 4188
Prejudice 1218 1118 1185 1615 1945 2085 897 10063
Job Loss 1221 1132 1193 1631 2094 1793 9064
Find Job 652 652
Wage Exp 596 578 600 846 976 1058 918 5572
Job Security 590 590
Bene¯ts 1149 1052 1121 1545 1849 1943 1641 10300
Need 923 1820 2743
More spending 924 1825 2749
Not all of these questions were asked in every year. The number of us-
able responses to each question in each year is summarised in table 2, where
usability is determined by availability of data on both regressors and depen-
dent variables. In our estimation procedures, we make maximum use of the
available data. All observations covered in table 2 are used.
4 Econometric Speci¯cation
4.1 Model Speci¯cation
Our data sources contain, besides attitudes towards immigration by di®erent
minority groups, attitudes towards related concerns, like job security, bene¯t
9expenditures and exclusively racial questions.
The model we specify is a multifactor model. We intend to relate the
attitudes towards immigration by various ethnic groups (including West In-
dians, Asians, Europeans, and Australians) to three factors: a racial factor,
a factor concerning labour market fears, and a factor regarding welfare con-
cerns. We also allow these attitudes to vary across individuals according to
other observed characteristics.
We observe only discrete responses to the immigration questions yi and
we assume corresponding latent variables y¤
i.
y
¤ = f ¤ + X A + u; (1)
where y¤ is an n £ m matrix of latent attitudinal responses to m immi-
gration questions for n individuals, and A is a k £ m matrix of conditional
responses of attitudes to k other observed characteristics X. The matrix f
is an n £ p matrix of factor scores capturing the p underlying dimensions
to attitudes towards immigration, and ¤ is a p £ m matrix of factor load-
ings, which map the factor scores into the attitudinal responses. We assume
that the error terms in the n £ m matrix u are normally distributed, with
u » N(0;§u), and uncorrelated with either X or f.
The factors are themselves assumed to be in°uenced by the regressors X:
f = X B + v; (2)
where B is a k £ p matrix of coe±cients in the underlying lower dimen-
sional model. We assume that v » N(0;§v). The assumption that u is
uncorrelated with X or f implies that u and v are not correlated.
10We can not directly observe these factors; instead, we observe an array
of responses to questions on issues which are each strongly related to one or
other of these factors. These include three sets of questions. First, there is
a set of questions indicating racial attitudes: speci¯cally, attitudes towards
inter ethnic marriage, having a minority boss, and self admitted prejudice
against minorities. Secondly, there are question regarding labour market se-
curity: speci¯cally questions on fear of job loss, ease of ¯nding a job and
expected future wage paths. Thirdly, there is a set of questions indicating
welfare concerns, including a question on adequacy of bene¯t levels, percep-
tion of recipients' need, and willingness to pay for increased public social
spending. Again, only discrete outcomes on these variables are observed.
The latent indices relate to the factors as follows:
z
¤ = f M + X C + w; (3)
where z¤ is a n£q matrix of latent responses, M is a p£q matrix of factor
loadings, C is a matrix of conditional responses to X, and w is an n£q matrix
of error terms, which are distributed normally, with w » N(0;§w). As with
u, w is assumed uncorrelated with X and f and therefore also with v. The
assumption of block diagonality on M will prove crucial to identi¯cation.
This structure implies an estimable reduced form, which can easily be ob-
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is the (m + q) £ (m + q) variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form
residuals and §uw denotes E(uw0).
4.2 Estimation
We estimate the reduced form in a two stage procedure to obtain estimates
of ¡ and §². We estimate ¡ by a series of independent (ordered) probits.
We then estimate the components of §² by pairwise bivariate Maximum
Likelihood, conditional upon the estimated probit coe±cients. Not all of the
questions used are asked in every year of our sample but there is su±cient
overlap to identify all reduced form parameters.
This estimation procedure is similar to that suggested by Muth¶ en (1984)
or by Browne and Arminger (1995). Our derivation of the variance covariance
matrix for the estimates draws on the arguments of Muth¶ en and Satorra
(1995).
12Let µ1 denote the vector of parameters estimated by independent ordered
probits in the ¯rst stage (which is to say the vector of the elements of ¡)
and let µ2 denote the vector of parameters estimated by pairwise bivariate
likelihood maximisation at the second stage (which is to say the vector of all





the vector of all reduced form parameters.
Let li(µ) denote a vector of the same dimensions as µ the elements of
which are the log likelihood contributions of the ith respondent to estima-
tion of the corresponding elements of µ. Note that di®erent likelihoods are










de¯ne a partition of li(µ) into elements corresponding to ¯rst and second
stage estimations.




























2(^ µ1;^ µ2) = 0:
Denote by qi(^ µ) ´ (qi
1(^ µ1)0;qi
2(^ µ1;^ µ2)0)0 the vector of stacked score con-
tributions for the ith respondent and by q(^ µ) ´
P
i qi(^ µ) = 0 the score
vector.
By the Mean Value Theorem
0 = q(^ µ) = q(µ) + Q(~ µ)(^ µ ¡ µ)
13for some ~ µ between ^ µ and µ, where Q(µ) ´@q(µ)=@µ. Therefore
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0, and ^ µ ! µ, we have
p
n(^ µ ¡ µ) ! N(0;A
¡1VA
0¡1);
where A ´ 1
nQ(µ).


























so that we can consistently estimate V and the block lower triangular matrix
A by taking the outer products of gradients indicated. We can thereby con-
sistently estimate the asymptotic variance covariance matrix of the estimates
by ^ - ´ ^ A¡1^ V^ A
0¡1
.
We then impose the restrictions in (5) and (6) in a second step by mini-
mum distance. The estimation procedure outlined above does not, however,
guarantee positive semi de¯niteness of ^ - which cannot therefore be used as
the weighting matrix 4. We chose as an alternative weighting matrix5 the
4In practice we ¯nd ^ - to have a few small negative eigenvalues
5Another idea would be to use the positive semi de¯nite matrix obtained from ^ - by
replacing the negative eigenvalues by zeros in the spectral decomposition. We found this
to give very unstable results.
14diagonal matrix dg(^ -) containing the diagonal elements of ^ -. Since this is
not the optimal weighting matrix the minimised value of the criterion does
not give the standard Â2 test of the restrictions so we use the formula in
Newey (1985).
4.3 Identi¯cation
Identi¯cation is poorly understood in these types of models (see Maddala
(1983) and Muth¶ en (1979)). We provide a heuristic discussion which estab-
lishes identi¯cation in our case.
Note that because of the discrete nature of the dependent variables we
can estimate only the ratios of the elements of ¡ to the standard deviations
of the associated components of ². Likewise we can estimate only the matrix
of correlations associated with §². We adopt the identifying normalisation
that the diagonal elements in §u and in §w are such as to make the diagonal
elements of §² equal to unity.
Consider ¯rstly identi¯cation of M and §v. This is achieved through
the imposition of structure on the M, §v and §w matrices. Speci¯cally, we
assume that M is a block diagonal matrix, with only one non-zero element
in each row. That is to say, we assume that each response in z¤ is indicative
of one and only one factor. Furthermore, we assume diagonality of the §w
matrix, so that all correlation between these responses is accounted for by
the factor structure. Finally, we set the diagonal elements of §v to unity.
These parameters are then identi¯ed by the restriction §22 = §w+M §v M0.
Remembering the particular block diagonal structure of M, suppose that the
ith block has qi elements. Then there are qi (qi¡1)=2 o®-diagonal elements in
the corresponding block of §22 from which to identify them. This is su±cient
15only if qi ¸ 3. This is so for each block in our case. Having identi¯ed M,
the o®-diagonal elements of §v are then identi¯ed without further restriction
from the remaining elements of §22, that is to say from the correlations
between elements in di®erent blocks. Notice that we allow for correlation
between the factors since §v is not required to be diagonal.
Now consider identi¯cation of the main parameters of interest, ¤. There is
more than one possibility here. Our favoured approach is to assume §uw = 0
and use §12 = M §v ¤0. That is to say, we assume that all conditional
correlation between responses to the immigration questions and the indicator
questions is accounted for by the factors of interest. With M and §v identi¯ed
elsewhere, this is su±cient to identify ¤ if p · q, which is to say that there
are fewer factors than indicator questions - a basic assumption.
It would also be possible to use an assumption of diagonality of §u and the
restriction §11 = §u +¤§v ¤0. This alone, however, gives only m(m¡1)=2
reduced form parameters from which to identify the mp parameters in ¤ and
is therefore su±cient only if p · (m ¡ 1)=2. This is not so in our example.
Besides, this seems to us a less desirable restriction to impose. We do not wish
to exclude the existence of other sources of correlation between immigration
responses, provided they are orthogonal to the factors of interest.
To identify B we can either assume C = 0 and use ¡2 = MB or A = 0
and use ¡1 = ¤B. If we use the ¯rst to identify B then A is plainly estimable.
5 Results
In the ¯rst step, we estimate independent probits on each of the attitude
questions. This provides estimates of ¡ in (4). The coe±cients of the four-
16teen independent probits, estimated for the sample of all respondents, are re-
ported in Tables 1-4. They are grouped according to their relevance either to
attitudes regarding immigration or to the three hypothesised underlying fac-
tors. The residual correlation matrix estimated at the second stage through
pairwise bivariate maximum likelihood techniques, which corresponds to §²
in (6), is shown in Table 5.
After having obtained estimates of ¡ and §², we impose restrictions in a
¯nal minimum distance stage. As we have discussed above, there are various
strategies to identify the model. The identi¯able parameters depend on the
restrictions we are willing to impose at this stage. Tables 6-8 report the
results of imposing increasingly more restrictions on the coe±cents in tables
1-5 so as to estimate successively larger sets of underlying parameters.
5.1 The full sample
In Table 6 we impose only the substantive assumptions of block diagonality
on M and diagonality on §w to identify the indicator loadings in M and
the correlations between factors in §v. As can be seen the restrictions are
comfortably accepted according to the Newey Â2 test. The common signs
of the factor loadings within blocks in the matrix M are consistent with
the desired interpretation. The coe±cients which re°ects the conditional
correlation between the three factors are displayed in the matrix §v. Note
the signi¯cant conditional correlations between antipathy to welfare spending
and both racial hostility and low job insecurity.
In Table 7 we add the restriction §uw = 0 and use §12 = M §v ¤0 to
identify the main parameters of interest ¤. The over identifying restrictions
are again accepted at usual signi¯cance levels suggesting that it may not be
17inappropriate to think that the conditional correlations between the immi-
gration responses and responses to the indicator questions can be accounted
for through the supposed factor structure.
The most striking result is the strength, both quantitatively and statisti-
cally, of the impact of racial attitudes on hostility to immigration from the
West Indies or from Asia. There is some evidence of a similar component to
attitudes towards European immigration but not to immigration from Aus-
tralia and New Zealand. This pattern of responses clearly ¯ts very well with
the proposed interpretation.
Estimated e®ects from job insecurity are weaker but there do appear
to be signi¯cant positive e®ects on attitudes to immigration from the West
Indies and Asia though much less as regards immigration from Europe or the
antipodes. Hostility to welfare spending seems similarly correlated.
Overall none of the factors seem to have any obvious bearing on atti-
tudes to immigration from Australia or New Zealand. The ¯gures in the last
column can be interpreted as the proportion of the residual variance which
is not associated with the factors. For immigration from the more ethni-
cally distinct sources, from one half to two thirds of the residual variance
remains unaccounted for in terms of the factor model. For immigration from
Australia and New Zealand, almost all remains unaccounted for.
In Table 8, the additional restriction C = 0 in (3) is used to identify B.
The Newey test indicates that this restriction is very strongly rejected. It
is nonetheless interesting to note that the estimates of M and ¤ are fairly
stable. It may still be worth considering the estimates of B which may be
indicative of the main forces driving the three aspects to attitudes. We have
displayed the results in the matrix B in table 8. Racial hostility is positively
18associated with ethnic concentration at county level and also perhaps with
low local unemployment rates. At the individual level hostility appears to
be lower for the highly educated, the young, Catholics, those on low incomes
and men. These results are compatible with the broad picture suggested in
Dustmann and Preston (1999).
Perceptions of job insecurity are strongest amongst poorer, older, female,
manual workers with low education and experience of unemployment. All
of these seem obviously sensible ¯ndings. Antipathy to welfare on the other
hand is strongest among richer, older, Protestant, and female respondents
living in areas of low unemployment. Again this seems reasonable.
5.2 Selected Subsamples
Our discussion above suggested that individuals in di®erent sectors of the
labour market, or of di®erent skill levels, may have reason to view immigra-
tion di®erently. In particular, it is often been argued that manual workers,
as well as less skilled workers, are more vulnerable to low skilled immigration
(Borjas 1999). If so, then one might expect that this may show up in a dif-
ference in the factors driving attitudes of workers in distinct labour market
segments.
Although our analysis above takes account of variables describing these
segments by incorporating them as regressors, we now estimate separate
systems for the di®erent groups, implicitly allowing all coe±cients to vary
with labour market sector.
Tables 9-13 report results for selected subsamples. In each case we show
the results imposing §22 = §w + M §v M0 and §12 = M §v ¤0. These are
typically the strongest restrictions accepted and allow identi¯cation of ¤ but
19not B. Restricting the sample to the employed has almost no e®ect on results
and we do not provide a separate table for these.
Tables 9 and 10 distinguish between manual and non manual employed
respondents. The impact of racial attitudes remain strong amongst manual
workers but the in°uence of the other two components is lost. Amongst non
manual workers these in°uences remain strong but this is the one group in
which the restrictions are rejected. This is contrary to what we would expect,
given the common perception that labour market and welfare considerations
are of more concern to manual workers than non manual workers.
Tables 11-13 show education groups separately. Here we see the strongest
e®ects among the group with medium education. For neither the highly
nor the poorly educated is there much evidence of in°uence from the job
insecurity or welfare antipathy components. For the highly educated - the
most tolerant group - there is not even any identi¯able in°uence from racial
hostility. To an extent this may simply re°ect the considerable reduction in
sample size.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
It is commonly argued that immigrants may be a burden on welfare and
public services, and that immigration may lead to job displacement of native
workers (see Borjas 1999 for an example of such arguments or Simon 1989
for a more skeptical view). If such views are shared by large numbers of
the public then (independently of whether they are justi¯ed) such concerns
may be an important component of aversion towards further immigration.
If such considerations contribute towards opinions on migration issues, then
20policies related to labour market security and welfare spending may have
important secondary e®ects on public opinion about and resistance towards
further immigration. By way of contrast, if hostility towards immigration
is rooted in racial hostility then it may be less responsive to more economic
interventions.
In this paper, we attempt to understand the importance of welfare and
labour market concerns, as well as racially inclined considerations for the
formation of opinions towards further immigration. We use data on attitudes
of the majority ethnic community in England to decompose attitudes towards
further immigration into a racial component, a welfare component, and a
component which re°ects labour market concerns. Based on several years
of data from the British Attitude Survey, we estimate a multi-stage factor
model, where we use opinions on welfare, racial, and labour market issues as
a means to separate attitudes towards further immigration into these three
components.
Our results are interesting in several aspects. First, we do ¯nd evidence
that both welfare and labour market concerns matter for the opinion towards
further immigration. However, by far the most important factor is racially
motivated opposition.
Second, we ¯nd that attitudes towards immigration, and the relative im-
portance of the three factors, di®ers according to the ethnic origin of the
immigrant population concerned. Our data allows us to distinguish between
attitudes towards four di®erent origin groups. Our results indicate that a
negative attitude towards further immigration is strongly related to all the
three factors for Asians and West Indians, while it is less strongly explained
for Europeans. The factors we have de¯ned hardly explain at all the atti-
21tudes towards Australians and New Zealanders, which suggests that opposi-
tion towards immigration from such sources is scarcely linked to any of our
systematic factors. The dominant racial factor is particularly strong for the
Asian and West Indian population.
Third, we do not ¯nd strong evidence that the greater labour market
concerns sometimes believed to exist among unskilled and manual workers are
re°ected in a higher loading of the labour market factor in opposition towards
further immigration. On the contrary, we ¯nd that welfare and labour market
concerns are more closely linked to opinions towards further immigration for
non-manual workers than for manual workers. Again, as above, there are
for all subgroups distinct di®erences according to origin country, with racial
factors being stronger for ethnically more di®erent populations.
22Table 1: Immigration Probits
Variable Less West Indian Less Asian Less Euro Less Australian
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio
Unemployment rate -2.49 -2.08 -3.38 -2.77 -1.08 -0.94 -1.29 -1.08
Ethnic minor. conc. -0.05 -2.06 -0.03 -1.36 -0.05 -1.86 -0.04 -1.51
Income Rank 0.32 3.33 0.25 2.54 0.21 2.28 0.43 4.42
Manual worker 0.07 1.27 0.12 2.23 0.14 2.50 0.05 0.94
Ever unemployed -0.04 -0.59 -0.01 -0.07 -0.04 -0.60 0.02 0.28
Ever long term unemp. 0.01 0.05 -0.10 -0.82 0.06 0.54 -0.06 -0.51
Female 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.97 0.06 1.26
High Education Level -0.42 -5.10 -0.48 -5.77 -0.34 -4.22 -0.23 -2.66
Low Education Level 0.06 1.04 0.09 1.55 0.13 2.32 0.15 2.77
Age 0.93 5.67 0.74 4.23 0.56 3.57 -0.28 -1.62
Catholic -0.16 -2.01 -0.18 -2.20 -0.05 -0.57 -0.07 -0.91
No religion 0.05 0.86 0.02 0.30 0.08 1.55 0.12 2.13
23Table 2: Racial Attitude Probits
Variable Marriage Boss Prejudice
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio
Unemployment rate, -1.41 -1.18 -2.72 -2.00 -1.71 -2.15
Ethnic minor. conc. 0.04 1.40 0.04 1.44 0.04 2.07
Income Rank 0.30 2.82 -0.12 -1.04 0.46 5.48
Manual worker 0.06 1.12 0.05 0.81 -0.09 -2.26
Ever unemployed 0.02 0.23 0.07 0.76 0.07 1.11
Ever long term unemp. 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.22 -0.06 -0.63
Female 0.03 0.56 -0.11 -1.89 -0.16 -4.34
High Education Level -0.32 -3.45 -0.25 -2.09 -0.32 -4.97
Low Education Level 0.06 1.01 -0.05 -0.77 0.04 0.89
Age 1.34 7.82 0.67 3.50 0.12 1.03
Catholic -0.13 -1.61 -0.19 -1.80 -0.27 -4.31
No religion -0.15 -2.62 0.10 1.53 0.04 1.00
24Table 3: Job Attitudes Probits
Variable Job Loss Find Job Wage Job Security
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio
Unemployment rate, 0.61 0.73 14.17 5.31 0.49 0.55 -1.09 -0.32
Ethnic minor. conc. 0.01 0.52 -0.08 -1.67 -0.04 -1.77 -0.06 -1.07
Income Rank -1.81 -19.41 -0.54 -2.70 -0.86 -9.40 0.06 0.21
Manual worker 0.01 0.27 0.17 1.59 0.25 4.76 0.31 2.48
Ever unemployed 0.15 2.64 0.15 0.97 -0.01 -0.21 0.68 4.16
Ever long term unemp. -0.16 -1.47 0.25 1.00 0.18 2.20 -0.51 -1.80
Female 0.25 5.97 -0.13 -1.31 0.32 7.06 -0.06 -0.48
High Education Level 0.16 2.44 0.10 0.62 -0.02 -0.25 0.07 0.44
Low Education Level -0.19 -3.92 -0.05 -0.44 0.03 0.65 0.12 0.97
Age 1.90 11.87 2.80 7.13 0.73 3.94 1.25 2.62
Catholic -0.03 -0.43 -0.06 -0.35 0.07 1.12 -0.05 -0.27
No religion -0.04 -0.90 0.08 0.85 0.01 0.32 0.05 0.44
25Table 4: Welfare Attitude Probits
Variable Bene¯ts Need More Spending
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio
Unemployment rate, -3.32 -3.90 -7.54 -5.81 -3.28 -2.49
Ethnic minor. conc. 0.02 0.85 0.06 2.09 -0.00 -0.13
Income Rank 0.43 4.94 0.12 1.05 0.56 4.94
Manual worker -0.15 -3.20 0.15 2.49 -0.13 -2.21
Ever unemployed -0.22 -3.12 -0.09 -1.05 -0.06 -0.63
Ever long term unemp. -0.20 -1.58 -0.10 -0.81 -0.01 -0.08
Female 0.07 1.46 0.10 1.87 0.05 0.83
High Education Level -0.42 -5.81 -0.39 -3.71 -0.18 -1.88
Low Education Level -0.01 -0.22 0.22 3.32 0.07 1.09
Age 1.11 8.21 0.84 4.33 -0.73 -3.77
Catholic -0.28 -3.81 -0.04 -0.51 -0.23 -2.54
No religion -0.13 -2.67 -0.04 -0.62 -0.11 -1.95
26Table 5: Correlation of Attitudes
LESSWIND 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LESSASIA 0.98 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . .
LESSEURO 0.85¤ 0.83¤ 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . .
LESSAUST 0.84¤ 0.81¤ 0.89¤ 1.00 . . . . . . . . . .
ANTIMETH 0.43¤ 0.48¤ 0.15¤ 0.04 1.00 . . . . . . . . .
ANTIBETH 0.40¤ 0.46¤ 0.07 -0.04 0.65¤ 1.00 . . . . . . . .
PREJETH 0.46¤ 0.50¤ 0.18¤ 0.07¤ 0.58¤ 0.63¤ 1.00 . . . . . . .
LOSEFEAR -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 1.00 . . . . . .
FINDEAS 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.12¤ 1.00 . . . . .
WAGEXPCT 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.09¤ 0.04 1.00 . . . .
JOBSEC 0.13 0.17¤ 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.04 -0.00 0.24¤ 0.24¤ 0.15 1.00 . . .
BENHIGH 0.18¤ 0.23¤ 0.10¤ 0.07 0.14¤ 0.14¤ 0.14¤ -0.06¤ -0.20¤ -0.03 -0.17¤ 1.00 . .
SOCHELP 0.23¤ 0.27¤ 0.13¤ 0.04 0.16¤ 0.22¤ 0.22¤ -0.08¤ -0.13¤ -0.07 -0.09 0.51¤ 1.00 .
MOREWE 0.14¤ 0.19¤ 0.07 0.01 0.15¤ 0.13¤ 0.16¤ -0.02 -0.05 -0.09 -0.01 0.37¤ 0.35¤ 1.00
Eigenvalues: 0.008, 0.031, 0.116, 0.322, 0.407, 0.480, 0.599, 0.667, 0.854, 0.983, 1.259, 1.766, 2.200, 4.308
27Table 6: All respondents, Minimum distance: §22 = §w + M §v M0
M
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(§w)
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe®
Marriage 0.760 16.27 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.423
Boss 0.832 15.18 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.307
Prejudice 0.771 17.43 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.406
Job Loss 0.000 0.00 0.424 6.37 0.000 0.00 0.820
Find Job 0.000 0.00 0.359 4.70 0.000 0.00 0.871
Wage 0.000 0.00 0.210 3.03 0.000 0.00 0.956
Job security 0.000 0.00 0.762 7.50 0.000 0.00 0.419
Bene¯ts 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.678 14.79 0.541
Need 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.734 16.78 0.461
More Spending 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.500 13.24 0.750
§v
Variable Race Jobs Welfare
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio
Race 1.000 1.00 -0.011 -0.16 0.313 6.54
Jobs -0.011 -0.16 1.000 1.00 -0.281 -4.01
Welfare 0.313 6.54 -0.281 -4.01 1.000 1.00
Newey Â2
32 = 33.819 P-value = 0.380
28Table 7: All respondents, Minimum distance: §22 = §w + M §v M0, §12 = M §v ¤0
M
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(§w)
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe®
Marriage 0.768 19.09 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.410
Boss 0.771 16.28 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.406
Prejudice 0.807 19.76 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.349
Job Loss 0.000 0.00 0.386 5.86 0.000 0.00 0.851
Find Job 0.000 0.00 0.365 4.82 0.000 0.00 0.867
Wage 0.000 0.00 0.206 2.93 0.000 0.00 0.957
Job security 0.000 0.00 0.815 7.76 0.000 0.00 0.336
Bene¯ts 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.669 14.17 0.552
Need 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.742 16.00 0.449
More Spending 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.498 12.92 0.752
¤
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(§u)
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe®
West Indian 0.497 11.56 0.135 2.03 0.171 2.86 0.667
Asian 0.551 12.12 0.152 2.35 0.221 3.62 0.569
European 0.136 3.39 0.102 1.45 0.138 2.35 0.949
Australian 0.013 0.32 0.070 0.96 0.095 1.54 0.989
§v
Variable Race Jobs Welfare
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio
Race 1.000 1.00 -0.009 -0.13 0.312 6.63
Jobs -0.009 -0.13 1.000 1.00 -0.282 -4.02
Welfare 0.312 6.63 -0.282 -4.02 1.000 1.00
Newey Â2
60 = 72.694 P-value = 0.126
29Table 8: All respondents, Minimum distance: §22 = §w + M §v M0, §12 = M §v ¤0,
¡2 = MB
M
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(§w)
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe®
Marriage 0.783 20.58 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.387
Boss 0.756 16.85 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.428
Prejudice 0.802 20.90 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.356
Job Loss 0.000 0.00 0.537 12.81 0.000 0.00 0.711
Find Job 0.000 0.00 0.339 7.60 0.000 0.00 0.885
Wage 0.000 0.00 0.263 9.27 0.000 0.00 0.931
Job security 0.000 0.00 0.464 8.89 0.000 0.00 0.784
Bene¯ts 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.719 18.06 0.483
Need 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.732 19.30 0.465
More Spending 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.480 14.45 0.770
¤
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(§u)
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe®
West Indian 0.506 12.19 0.097 1.63 0.151 2.71 0.675
Asian 0.562 12.78 0.105 1.81 0.196 3.46 0.582
European 0.144 3.74 0.066 1.06 0.120 2.20 0.955
Australian 0.019 0.47 0.033 0.51 0.081 1.40 0.993
B
Variable Race Jobs Welfare
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio
Unemployment rate -2.261 -2.13 2.423 1.27 -6.335 -4.84
Ethnic concentration 0.056 2.54 -0.017 -0.44 0.036 1.40
Income 0.372 3.73 -3.037 -10.57 0.531 4.51
Manual -0.012 -0.26 0.261 2.78 -0.084 -1.41
Ever unemployed 0.077 1.11 0.418 3.12 -0.226 -2.33
Ever long term -0.045 -0.40 0.235 0.95 -0.197 -1.40
Female -0.131 -2.84 0.493 5.49 0.113 1.97
High education -0.401 -4.87 0.214 1.74 -0.567 -5.30
Low education 0.012 0.22 -0.234 -2.11 0.094 1.47
Age 0.695 4.52 3.733 7.56 1.081 5.54
Catholic -0.288 -3.84 0.014 0.10 -0.294 -3.23
No religion -0.015 -0.31 -0.012 -0.13 -0.139 -2.26
30§v
Variable Race Jobs Welfare
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio
Race 1.000 1.00 0.025 0.39 0.301 6.60
Jobs 0.025 0.39 1.000 1.00 0.263 3.84
Welfare 0.301 6.60 0.263 3.84 1.000 1.00
Newey Â2
144 = 3498.227 P-value = 0.000
31Table 9: Manual employed, Minimum distance: §22 = §w + M §v M0, §12 = M §v ¤0
M
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(§w)
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe®
Marriage 0.761 11.09 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.421
Boss 0.770 10.23 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.407
Prejudice 0.784 11.18 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.386
Job Loss 0.000 0.00 0.436 3.02 0.000 0.00 0.810
Find Job 0.000 0.00 0.412 2.43 0.000 0.00 0.830
Wage 0.000 0.00 0.146 1.17 0.000 0.00 0.979
Job security 0.000 0.00 0.491 2.79 0.000 0.00 0.759
Bene¯ts 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.688 6.92 0.527
Need 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.738 7.29 0.455
More Spending 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.406 5.46 0.835
¤
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(§u)
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe®
West Indian 0.536 7.43 0.108 0.89 0.113 1.10 0.672
Asian 0.596 7.51 0.106 0.80 0.125 1.18 0.596
European 0.183 3.12 0.010 0.08 0.108 1.12 0.947
Australian 0.018 0.29 -0.086 -0.64 0.097 0.95 0.977
§v
Variable Race Jobs Welfare
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio
Race 1.000 1.00 -0.036 -0.31 0.224 3.10
Jobs -0.036 -0.31 1.000 1.00 -0.266 -1.91
Welfare 0.224 3.10 -0.266 -1.91 1.000 1.00
Newey Â2
60 = 47.266 P-value = 0.884
32Table 10: Non manual employed, Minimum distance: §22 = §w + M §v M0, §12 =
M §v ¤0
M
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(§w)
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe®
Marriage 0.774 13.45 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.401
Boss 0.782 11.57 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.388
Prejudice 0.800 14.45 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.360
Job Loss 0.000 0.00 0.228 2.70 0.000 0.00 0.948
Find Job 0.000 0.00 0.309 2.93 0.000 0.00 0.904
Wage 0.000 0.00 0.284 2.72 0.000 0.00 0.919
Job security 0.000 0.00 0.829 4.24 0.000 0.00 0.313
Bene¯ts 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.651 10.22 0.577
Need 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.743 11.88 0.448
More Spending 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.573 9.62 0.671
¤
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(§u)
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe®
West Indian 0.436 5.68 0.199 1.77 0.279 2.95 0.634
Asian 0.457 5.84 0.277 2.67 0.391 3.96 0.495
European 0.050 0.66 0.200 1.78 0.226 2.46 0.928
Australian -0.047 -0.57 0.205 1.72 0.145 1.53 0.960
§v
Variable Race Jobs Welfare
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio
Race 1.000 1.00 -0.010 -0.09 0.400 6.05
Jobs -0.010 -0.09 1.000 1.00 -0.337 -3.18
Welfare 0.400 6.05 -0.337 -3.18 1.000 1.00
Newey Â2
60 = 90.531 P-value = 0.007
33Table 11: High education, employed, Minimum distance: §22 = §w + M §v M0, §12 =
M §v ¤0
M
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(§w)
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe®
Marriage 0.813 5.10 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.339
Boss 0.900 5.52 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.191
Prejudice 0.687 5.32 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.528
Job Loss 0.000 0.00 0.189 1.13 0.000 0.00 0.964
Find Job 0.000 0.00 0.267 0.87 0.000 0.00 0.929
Wage 0.000 0.00 -0.242 -1.18 0.000 0.00 0.941
Job security 0.000 0.00 0.631 1.44 0.000 0.00 0.601
Bene¯ts 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.800 3.36 0.361
Need 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.775 4.07 0.399
More Spending 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.673 3.77 0.546
¤
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(§u)
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe®
West Indian 0.421 1.26 0.480 1.24 0.263 0.91 0.313
Asian 0.429 1.34 0.499 1.42 0.310 1.03 0.227
European -0.064 -0.24 0.426 1.32 0.259 0.91 0.756
Australian -0.137 -0.49 0.472 1.32 0.235 0.85 0.742
§v
Variable Race Jobs Welfare
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio
Race 1.000 1.00 0.166 0.52 0.555 3.51
Jobs 0.166 0.52 1.000 1.00 0.084 0.31
Welfare 0.555 3.51 0.084 0.31 1.000 1.00
Newey Â2
60 = 37.434 P-value = 0.990
34Table 12: Medium education, employed, Minimum distance: §22 = §w + M §v M0,
§12 = M §v ¤0
M
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(§w)
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe®
Marriage 0.791 11.04 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.374
Boss 0.778 9.31 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.394
Prejudice 0.802 11.30 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.357
Job Loss 0.000 0.00 0.308 3.01 0.000 0.00 0.905
Find Job 0.000 0.00 0.459 3.85 0.000 0.00 0.789
Wage 0.000 0.00 0.234 1.86 0.000 0.00 0.945
Job security 0.000 0.00 0.750 4.50 0.000 0.00 0.437
Bene¯ts 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.642 7.07 0.588
Need 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.752 7.89 0.435
More Spending 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.444 6.16 0.803
¤
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(§u)
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe®
West Indian 0.475 5.99 0.191 1.50 0.220 2.07 0.644
Asian 0.514 6.37 0.223 1.92 0.316 3.17 0.516
European 0.129 1.76 0.192 1.45 0.146 1.46 0.928
Australian 0.009 0.13 0.061 0.51 0.014 0.15 0.996
§v
Variable Race Jobs Welfare
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio
Race 1.000 1.00 -0.002 -0.02 0.333 4.12
Jobs -0.002 -0.02 1.000 1.00 -0.273 -2.50
Welfare 0.333 4.12 -0.273 -2.50 1.000 1.00
Newey Â2
60 = 67.537 P-value = 0.235
35Table 13: Low education, employed, Minimum distance: §22 = §w + M §v M0, §12 =
M §v ¤0
M
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(§w)
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe®
Marriage 0.742 11.43 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.450
Boss 0.751 10.15 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.437
Prejudice 0.811 11.30 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.343
Job Loss 0.000 0.00 0.234 2.06 0.000 0.00 0.945
Find Job 0.000 0.00 0.654 2.33 0.000 0.00 0.572
Wage 0.000 0.00 0.151 1.19 0.000 0.00 0.977
Job security 0.000 0.00 0.173 1.07 0.000 0.00 0.970
Bene¯ts 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.669 7.80 0.552
Need 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.750 7.95 0.438
More Spending 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.455 6.81 0.793
¤
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(§u)
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe®
West Indian 0.522 7.73 -0.008 -0.05 0.068 0.50 0.706
Asian 0.576 7.69 0.010 0.06 0.113 0.79 0.625
European 0.120 1.86 0.077 0.41 0.154 1.13 0.959
Australian -0.010 -0.14 0.013 0.06 0.121 0.80 0.987
§v
Variable Race Jobs Welfare
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio
Race 1.000 1.00 -0.004 -0.03 0.242 3.34
Jobs -0.004 -0.03 1.000 1.00 -0.485 -2.33
Welfare 0.242 3.34 -0.485 -2.33 1.000 1.00
Newey Â2
60 = 42.861 P-value = 0.954
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387 Appendix: Wording of the Questions
Table A 1: Immigration Questions
Response West Indians Indians Common Market Australians and
and Pakistanis Countries (Europe) New Zealanders
more settlement,
about the same 34.79 31.06 55.29 68.01
less settlement 65.21 68.94 44.71 31.99
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Wording of Question: Britain controls the number of people from abroad that are allowed to settle in this
country. Please say for each of the groups below whether you think Britain should allow more settlement,
less settlement, or about the same as now.
Table A 2: Racial Acceptability Questions
Opposition to Opposition to
Response Marriage Boss
Not mind 48.09 81.11
Mind 51.91 18.89
100.00 100.00
Wording of Question: Do you think most people in Britain would mind
(or not mind) if one of their close relatives were to marry a person of Asian
/ West Indian origin? ... and you personally? Would you mind or not mind?
Do you think most people in Britain would mind (or not mind) if a suitably
quali¯ed person of Asian / West Indian origin were appointed as their boss?
... and you personally? Would you mind or not mind?
Table A 3: Racial Prejudice
Response
Not prejudiced at all 63.73
Very or a little prejudiced 36.27
100.00
Wording of Question: How would you de-
scribe yourself? As very prejudiced against
people of other races, a little prejudiced, or
not prejudiced at all?




Wording of Question: If employed: Think-
ing now about your own job, how likely (or
unlikely) is it that you will leave this employer
over the next year for any reason? ... Why do
you think you will leave?
People recorded as likely are those who an-
swered very likely or quite likely to the ¯rst
question and gave as reason ¯rm will close
down, I will be declared redundant, or my con-
tract of employment will expire.







Wording of Question: If in paid job for 10
or more hours a week: If you lost your job for
any reason, and were looking actively for an-
other one, how easy, or di±cult, do you think
it would be for you to ¯nd an acceptable job?
If in paid job for less than 10 hours a week or
no paid job: If you were looking actively, how
easy, or di±cult, do you think it would be for
you to ¯nd an acceptable job?
Table A 6: Wage Expectations
rise by more than cost of living 16.86
rise by same as cost of living 48.15
rise by less than cost of living 26.60
not rise at all 8.39
100.00
Wording of Question: If employee: If you
stay in this job, would you expect your wages
or salary over the coming year to ...







Wording of Question: If in paid work for
10 or more hours a week, please tick one box
to show how much you agree or disagree that
[this statement] applies to your job: My job is
secure.
Table A 8: Level of Bene¯ts
too low or neither 65.97
too high 34.03
100.00
Wording of Question: Opinions di®er about
the level of bene¯ts for the unemployed.
Which of these ... statements comes closest
to your own: Bene¯ts for the unemployed are
too low and cause hardship or Bene¯ts for the
unemployed are too high and discourage people
from ¯nding jobs.
In later years, people are allowed to agree to
both - in all years we categorise according to
whether people accept only the second state-
ment.
Table A 9: Attitudes to Welfare
Responses Need More spending




strongly disagree 5.93 1.73
100.00 100.00
41Wording of Question: Please tick one box
for each statement below to show how much
you agree or disagree with it.
Many people who get social security do not re-
ally deserve any help.
The government should spend more money on
welfare bene¯ts for the poor, even if it leads to
higher taxes.
We reverse the answers to the ¯rst statement.
42